Firewalls, IDS/IPS, VPNs, DMZ architecture, network segmentation, protocols, and wireless security. Weight: ~18% of exam.
| Type | What It Inspects | Key Feature |
|---|---|---|
| Packet Filtering | IP headers only (src/dst IP, port, protocol) | Layer 3/4. Fast but no context. Stateless. |
| Stateful Inspection | Connection state table | Tracks sessions — knows if packet is part of established connection |
| NGFW (Next-Gen) | Full packet content + application identity | Deep packet inspection, app-aware, IPS built-in |
| WAF (Web App) | HTTP/HTTPS traffic specifically | Protects web apps from XSS, SQLi, OWASP Top 10 |
| Host-based | Traffic to/from one specific host | Software on endpoint (Windows Defender Firewall) |
Firewalls are broadly categorized by the layers of the OSI model they inspect and the degree of contextual awareness they maintain (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). Packet-filtering firewalls operate at Layers 3 and 4 and evaluate each packet independently without session context, making them fast but unable to detect attacks spread across multiple packets (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). Stateful inspection firewalls improve on this by maintaining a connection state table, tracking the full TCP handshake to distinguish legitimate session traffic from unsolicited packets (Stallings, 2017). Next-generation firewalls (NGFWs) extend stateful inspection with deep packet inspection and application-layer visibility, enabling policy enforcement based on application identity rather than port alone (Cisco, 2024). Web application firewalls (WAFs) specifically target Layer 7 HTTP/HTTPS traffic, protecting against OWASP Top 10 threats including SQL injection and cross-site scripting (OWASP Foundation, 2021). Host-based firewalls provide a final layer of defense on individual endpoints, complementing network-level controls (CompTIA, 2023).
| Feature | IDS | IPS |
|---|---|---|
| Action | Detects and ALERTS only — passive | Detects and BLOCKS — active inline |
| Placement | Out-of-band (copy of traffic via tap/SPAN) | Inline — all traffic passes through it |
| False positive impact | Alert noise — no traffic disruption | Can block legitimate traffic — service disruption |
| Detection method — Signature | Matches known attack patterns | Same — known signatures |
| Detection method — Anomaly/Heuristic | Baseline behavior, detects deviations | Same — can catch zero-days |
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) monitor network traffic for signs of malicious activity using two primary detection approaches (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). Signature-based detection compares traffic against a database of known attack patterns, offering high accuracy for documented threats but no coverage for zero-day exploits (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). Anomaly-based detection establishes a behavioral baseline and flags deviations, enabling detection of novel attacks at the cost of higher false-positive rates (Stallings, 2017). An IDS is deployed out-of-band — receiving a copy of traffic via a SPAN port or tap — and responds to threats with alerts only, leaving traffic unaffected (Scarfone & Mell, 2007). An IPS is placed inline so all traffic traverses it, enabling active blocking; however, a false positive in an IPS can disrupt legitimate services, a key operational trade-off tested on the Security+ exam (CompTIA, 2023).
A DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) is a network segment that sits between the public internet and the internal private network. Public-facing servers (web, email, DNS) live here so a compromise doesn't directly reach internal systems. The dual-firewall DMZ architecture is a foundational network security pattern, placing the outer firewall between the internet and DMZ and the inner firewall between the DMZ and the internal LAN (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009).
VLANs logically segment a physical network — a compromised device in VLAN 10 (users) cannot directly reach VLAN 20 (servers) without going through a router/firewall (Stallings, 2017). Microsegmentation extends this principle to individual workloads, enforcing granular east-west traffic policies within a data center or cloud environment; this supports Zero Trust architectures in which no traffic is implicitly trusted regardless of its network origin (SANS Institute, 2024).
An air gap is physical isolation — no network connection at all. Used for top-secret or critical infrastructure systems where even a compromised network segment must not reach the protected asset (CompTIA, 2023).
| Type | Protocol | Use Case |
|---|---|---|
| Remote Access VPN | IPSec, SSL/TLS | Individual user connecting to corporate network |
| Site-to-Site VPN | IPSec | Connects two offices' networks permanently |
| SSL VPN | TLS (port 443) | Browser-based, no client software needed — clientless |
| Split Tunneling | Any | Only corporate traffic goes through VPN; internet traffic is direct |
| Full Tunneling | Any | ALL traffic routed through VPN — more secure, slower |
IPSec is a framework of open standards that provides confidentiality, integrity, and authentication for IP-layer communications (Kent & Seo, 2005). The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate cryptographic parameters and establish security associations between peers (Barker et al., 2020). IPSec modes: Transport mode encrypts only the payload (used for host-to-host communications). Tunnel mode encapsulates the entire original IP packet under a new IP header, protecting both payload and original headers — the standard mode for site-to-site VPNs (Barker et al., 2020). SSL/TLS VPNs operate over port 443 using the TLS protocol; TLS 1.3 (RFC 8446) significantly reduces handshake latency and removes deprecated cipher suites compared to earlier versions (Rescorla, 2018).
| Protocol | Encryption | Status |
|---|---|---|
| WEP | RC4 (40/104-bit) | Broken — cracked in minutes. Never use. |
| WPA | TKIP (RC4-based) | Deprecated — TKIP has weaknesses. |
| WPA2 | AES-CCMP | Current minimum. KRACK vulnerability exists. |
| WPA3 | AES-GCMP-256, SAE | Current best. SAE replaces PSK — resists offline dictionary attacks. |
| 802.1X / EAP | Varies by EAP type | Enterprise — per-user authentication via RADIUS server. |
NIST guidance on securing wireless LANs recommends WPA2 with AES-CCMP as a minimum standard, with WPA2-Enterprise (802.1X/EAP) preferred over WPA2-Personal for organizational deployments (Souppaya & Scarfone, 2012). WPA3 was introduced by the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2018 to address WPA2 weaknesses; it replaces the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) exchange with Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE), which provides forward secrecy and resistance to offline dictionary attacks (Wi-Fi Alliance, 2018). The urgency for WPA3 was partly driven by the 2017 KRACK (Key Reinstallation Attack) disclosure, in which Vanhoef and Piessens demonstrated that the WPA2 four-way handshake is vulnerable to nonce reuse, enabling an attacker within radio range to decrypt traffic without knowing the pre-shared key (Vanhoef & Piessens, 2017). 802.1X provides port-based network access control, requiring successful EAP authentication to a RADIUS server before any traffic is forwarded — an effective mitigation against both evil twin attacks and unauthorized device access (IEEE, 2020).
Evil Twin attack: Attacker sets up a rogue AP with the same SSID as a legitimate network. Users connect thinking it's real — MitM. Mitigated by 802.1X enterprise auth, which requires mutual certificate validation (Souppaya & Scarfone, 2012).
Deauthentication attack: Attacker sends deauth frames to disconnect users. Part of WPA2 cracking workflow — forces reconnect to capture handshake for offline cracking (Vanhoef & Piessens, 2017).
The CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 exam requires candidates to identify insecure protocols and their secure replacements as part of network hardening (CompTIA, 2023). Port 443 carries HTTPS traffic secured by TLS; TLS 1.3 (Rescorla, 2018) is the current recommended version, having deprecated vulnerable cipher suites present in TLS 1.2 and earlier. Firewall policy should deny inbound access to high-risk ports such as 23 (Telnet), 21 (FTP), and 161/162 (SNMPv1/v2) at the network perimeter while permitting only necessary services (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009). IPSec VPN traffic typically traverses UDP port 500 (IKE) and 4500 (NAT traversal), which must be permitted in firewall rules for site-to-site connectivity (Barker et al., 2020).
Barker, E., Dang, Q., Frankel, S., Scarfone, K., & Wouters, P. (2020). Guide to IPsec VPNs (NIST Special Publication 800-77 Rev. 1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-77r1
Cichonski, J., Franklin, J. M., & Bartock, M. (2017). Guide to LTE security (NIST Special Publication 800-187). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-187
Cisco. (2024). What is a next-generation firewall (NGFW)? https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/learn/topics/security/what-is-a-next-generation-firewall.html
CompTIA. (2023). CompTIA Security+ SY0-701 exam objectives. https://assets.ctfassets.net/82ripq7fjls2/6TYWUym0Nudqa8nGEnegjG/0f9b974d3b1837fe85ab8e6553f4d623/CompTIA-Security-Plus-SY0-701-Exam-Objectives.pdf
IEEE. (2020). IEEE standard for local and metropolitan area networks — port-based network access control (IEEE Std 802.1X-2020). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEESTD.2020.9093580
Kent, S., & Seo, K. (2005). Security architecture for the Internet Protocol (RFC 4301). Internet Engineering Task Force. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4301
OWASP Foundation. (2021). Web Application Firewall. https://owasp.org/www-community/Web_Application_Firewall
Rescorla, E. (2018). The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3 (RFC 8446). Internet Engineering Task Force. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446
SANS Institute. (2024). Best practices for securing your network with Zero Trust Network Access. https://www.sans.org/blog/best-practices-for-securing-your-network-with-zero-trust-network-access
Scarfone, K., & Hoffman, P. (2009). Guidelines on firewalls and firewall policy (NIST Special Publication 800-41 Rev. 1). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-41r1
Scarfone, K., & Mell, P. (2007). Guide to intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) (NIST Special Publication 800-94). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-94
Souppaya, M., & Scarfone, K. (2012). Guidelines for securing wireless local area networks (WLANs) (NIST Special Publication 800-153). National Institute of Standards and Technology. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-153
Stallings, W. (2017). Network security essentials: Applications and standards (6th ed.). Pearson.
Vanhoef, M., & Piessens, F. (2017). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '17), 1313–1328. https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134027
Wi-Fi Alliance. (2018). Wi-Fi certified WPA3 specification. https://www.wi-fi.org/file/wpa3-specification